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Introduction 
Colin Clark was one of two great Australian economists (the other being Trevor Swan) whose 
location, at least arguably, denied them a share in the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. His 
greatest contribution to economics was the development of the first system of national 
accounts for the UK (Clark 1932). This work was undertaken at the same time as, but 
independently of, Kuznets‟ (1934) development of national accounts for the United States, 
which was the primary basis for the award of the 1971 Nobel. 
This was far from being Clark‟s only achievement. He was a student of Beveridge, a colleague 
and protégé of Keynes and a co-author of Pigou, all of whom clearly regarded him as an 
intellectual equal.  His work on world food supply led him to be named by the World Bank as 
one of the pioneers of development along with Sir Arthur Lewis, Gunnar Myrdal, W.W. 
Rostow and Jan Tinbergen (all of whom, except Rostow, were Nobelists). 
Despite the potential for a glittering career in his native England, he agreed in 1937, to take on 
the position of Government Statistician, Director of the Bureau of Industry, and Financial 
Advisor to Queensland Treasury, beginning a 50 year association with Queensland, which 
included a lengthy period as Research Consultant to the Department of Economics at the 
University of Queensland. 
It is, therefore, a great honour to be asked to give the Colin Clark Memorial lecture, and natural 
to choose as my topic the future of national accounting. I will argue that, just as Clark 
developed a new set of concepts to meet the needs of the 20th century industrial economy, we 
are now faced with the task of developing accounting concepts for the digital economy of the 
21st century. 
The key problem for national accounting in the 20th century was that of the input-output 
relationships between industries. The solution in national accounting terms was the concept of 
„value added‟. This concept was crucial in measuring economic activity for the purposes of 
macroeconomic management and in assessing the rate of economic growth. 
In the 21st century, the crucial problem is to account for the value of information. Information 
is, naturally a public good, even though it is costly to produce. Moreover, the distinctions 
central to the 20th century economy, such as those between primary, secondary and tertiary 
industry, and between households and the market economy are increasingly irrelevant.  These 
changes bring new policy challenges and, with them, the need for new systems of national 
accounting. 
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The 20th century national accounting framework  
The idea of national accounts, developed by Clark and Kuznets, was one of the great 
conceptual advances of 20th century economics.  
Estimates of national income go back at least to the work of Sir William Petty (1662). Petty 
was largely concerned with the capacity of the economy to generate revenue, a concern that 
was central to earlier surveys such as the famous Domesday Book.  
Governments have always been concerned with their capacity to raise revenue. However, it 
was only in the 20th century that the demands of economic management reached the point 
where a more comprehensive measurement of the volume and value of economic activity was 
urgently required. 
Two developments were critical to the initial development of national accounts in the 1930s 
and 1940s. The first was the rise of Keynesian macroeconomic theory, which gave a formal 
basis for the idea that the actual output of the economy could remain below potential output for 
lengthy periods, with the associated unemployment of labour and underutilisation of capital. 
The second was the need for centralised allocation of resources in the context of a war 
economy. Wartime planning required the ability to measure the existing output of different 
sectors of the economy in order to reallocate resources to the needs of the war effort, while 
maintaining essential productive activity. 
These challenges continued, in a different form, in the aftermath of World War II. Although the 
planning systems and controls of the war economy were gradually dismantled, the economic 
role of the state had grown dramatically, both in qualitative and quantitative terms, relative to 
the interwar period and, even more, relative to the largely free-market economy of the period of 
economic stability before 1914.  
During the postwar decades, the economy was transformed by the rise of Keynesian 
macroeconomic management and the social democratic mixed economy. The anti-Keynesian 
counter-revolution of the 1970s halted, but did not reverse, the growth of the state, whether this 
was expressed in terms of the ratio of tax revenue to national income or of the share of the 
public and regulated sector in economic activity 
The activist state of the 20th century required statistical information about economic activity, 
and a framework for analysing the impact of policy on economic welfare. National accounts 
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were vital for this task For various reasons, a single number, Gross Domestic Product, or GDP 
came to encapsulate the complex picture of the economy presented in the accounts. 
The industrial economy 
The central intellectual challenge in national accounting arose from the nature of the industrial 
economy that emerged in the 19th century and reached its apogee during the postwar long 
boom. As those who received their school education in this period will recall, the standard 
representation of the industrial economy involved three stages of production: primary, 
secondary and tertiary1. 
The primary stage (agriculture, forestry, fisheries and mining) involved the exploitation of land 
and natural resources to produce food, fibre and mineral commodities.  The secondary stage 
(manufacturing, construction and related activities) involved processing primary products to 
produce consumer goods. Finally, the tertiary stage (wholesale and retail trade, transport, 
financial services) involved the set of activities needed to deliver goods to consumers. 
This multi-stage production process created problems for national accounting and also for 
public policy, in areas such as taxation. The problems may be illustrated by considering a 
simple item such as a loaf of bread. The delivery of bread to the household would typically 
involve a series of transactions such as the sale of wheat by farmers to millers, the sale of flour 
by millers to bakeries, the sale of bread by bakeries to supermarkets and the final sale to 
consumers. Each of this transactions would be measured in the process of collecting data for 
national accounts. Moreover, in a transactions-based tax system, such as that prevailing in 
many European countries in the early 20th century, each of these transactions might be subject 
to tax. 
The problem is that the total value of the transactions involved will be larger than, and perhaps 
many times larger than, the final value of the loaf of bread. If all transactions are counted (and 
taxed) the result will be a misleading set of national accounts (and a burdensome and 
inefficient taxation system).  
The solution, for both national accounts and taxation, is to focus on „value added‟. That is, the 
market value of primary products is attributed entirely to the primary sector. This value is then 
netted out from the wholesale value of goods to determine the value added by secondary 
                                                 
1 This terminology, reflecting the temporal stages of production, was commonly associated with a ranking of 
economic virtue, with primary industry being superior to secondary, and the tertiary stage of production seen as an 
unfortunate, but unavoidable, cost burden. 
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industry.  This value, in turn is netted out from the retail price of goods to determine the value 
added in the tertiary sector. 
Household vs market 
An equally important, and historically unique feature of the 20th century industrial economy 
was a sharp division between the household economy and the market economy. Households 
earned and spent money income in the market economy, through work and returns on financial 
assets. Each household also formed its own economy, within which family members produced, 
and consumed, services such as cooking, cleaning and childcare. 
This division between market and household corresponded closely to a gender division 
between men‟s and women‟s work. Particularly in the period immediately after World War II 
commanded strong normative support and corresponded to reality for a large proportion of 
households, particularly those in the growing middle class. The norm was enforced by unequal 
pay and policies that required women to resign from positions in the public service on 
marriage. 
As feminist critics of these structures pointed out, women‟s labour within the household was 
essential to the operation of the economy. Women reproduced the labour force, not merely in 
the literal sense of bearing and raising children, but also in providing the daily services needed 
by the male „breadwinner‟ to perform his work in the market sector. 
In the economic analysis that formed the basis of National Accounts, this distinction was taken 
for granted.  The anomalies that arose from arrangements outside the norm (for example, 
Pigou‟s (1932, p32-33) observation that „when a man marries his housekeeper, gross domestic 
product declines‟) were considered sufficiently modest to be ignored. 
Public goods and information 
One of the more difficult problems in national accounting is that of accounting for public 
goods, which are non-rival and non-excludable. These characteristics mean that the value of 
public goods in consumption cannot be measured by market observations. This problem is 
conceptually distinct from that of valuing publicly provided services, such as health and 
education, which are primarily private goods but are not traded at market prices. However, the 
solution has been the same in both cases: to value public goods and publicly provided services 
at their cost of production.  
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Information is an almost perfect example of a pure public good. It is completely nonrival and 
largely nonexcludable. Nonrivalry means that, once produced, information can be used by as 
many people as can gain access to it, without reducing its availability to others. The crucial 
development of the information revolution has been to reduce the cost of distributing 
information, in many cases effectively to zero. Nonexcludability means that it is hard (though 
not impossible) to make information available to some users while excluding others. The 
crucial development here is the ease with which information can be reproduced. 
Most public goods are local in some sense. The usual textbook examples of pure public goods 
include national defence and protection against floods, both of which apply only to the nation 
or river basin being protected. Public goods are also, in most cases, time-specific. Services 
(e.g., fireworks displays) are commonly consumed simultaneously with their production, while 
physical goods depreciate. 
By contrast, information is naturally global and timeless in its nonrivalry. Once information 
has been discovered, it is available for all time and in all places. The words of Homer are still 
available to us, despite the thousands of years and (for Australians) thousands of kilometres 
that separate us from the courts of ancient Greece. Our inheritance from the past consists, 
ultimately, of information (technology and culture) rather than physical goods. 
Not only is information nonrival, but positive externalities arise from sharing information. As 
information is used or transmitted, it is refined and modified in various ways. Both conscious 
elaboration and the quasi-evolutionary processes that produce what Dawkins (1976) calls 
“memes” (others might prefer terms such as “folk tradition”) allow information to be 
transformed into more useful or memorable forms through the very process of use.  
The production and dissemination of information does not fit naturally into the model of the 
industrial economy on which the system of national accounts is based. These activities have 
therefore been treated in an ad hoc fashion, on the basis that the value of outputs is assumed 
equal to the value of inputs. 
GDP and NNI 
The separation between household and market work made sense for some of the purposes for 
which national accounts were used. Most importantly, the primary requirement for 
macroeconomic management is a measure of economic activity in the market sector. The tools 
of macroeconomic management (fiscal and monetary policy) work almost entirely on the 
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demand for market goods and the supply of labor to the market. The question of whether 
unemployed workers are idle or devote themselves to work within the household, while 
important as regards the welfare effects of unemployment, is of little concern in the 
formulation of fiscal and monetary policy. 
On the other hand, the exclusion of the household sector, and of women‟s work made national 
income aggregates much less useful as a measure of welfare. Waring (1988) made this case 
very forcefully. The only reasonable response is that welfare measurement is not a sensible use 
of GDP.  
More generally, the needs of macroeconomic management explain the much-criticised focus 
on GDP as a headline summary statistic for the National Accounts. Critics point out that GDP 
is a poor measure of welfare, since it is typically increased by obviously bad events, from car 
crashes to natural disasters.  I have summarised the objections with the observation that there 
only three things wrong with GDP as a welfare measure: 
* It‟s Gross: That is, GDP takes no account of depreciation of the capital stock, whether 
through normal wear and tear or through destructive events like those mentioned above. For 
welfare purposes, it would be far better to focus on a net measure, ideally one that took account 
of changes in the stock of natural capital, such as land and forests 
* It‟s Domestic: That is, GDP includes income generated in Australia, but flowing to 
foreigners, and excludes the income earned by Australians on investments overseas. Again, 
this makes sense if we are concerned to measure economic activity, but not if we are concerned 
to measure economic welfare 
* It‟s a Product: Although the construction of the accounts means that Product and Income 
measures should be equal (in reality, there‟s a small statistical discrepancy), the purpose of 
current activity is to generate income that can be consumed or invested. A focus on product 
measures again reflects a concern with economic activity. Income measures can also be 
extended to take account of the value of non-market time, used either for leisure or for 
household work. 
It‟s striking that the National Accounts contain a measure that corrects most (not all) of these 
problems. From the description above, those familiar with the accounts will recognise that I am 
suggesting that many of the problems with GDP could be dealt with if we looked instead at Net 
National Income (NNI). 
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There would be no need for any change in current accounting procedures. It would simply be a 
matter of changing the standard ABS press release to announce the change in NNI first, with 
GDP being mentioned later on.  This would be more informative for the general public and 
would cause no difficulties for specialist users who preferred to focus on GDP. 
In summary, GDP is a poor measure of welfare. Unfortunately, while this point is often 
acknowledged by economists when pressed with criticism of GDP, it is equally often ignored 
when analysing policy issues in which GDP is taken as a criterion. For example, the generally 
excellent Henry review of the tax system advocated a number of reforms favourable to capital 
on the basis that they would increase investment and therefore GDP. But assuming that capital 
is internationally traded and earns its marginal product, there is no reason, in general, to expect 
any change in NNI from an increase in foreign investment. 
Endogenous Growth 
Analysis of economic growth has traditionally focused on the accumulation of the physical 
factors of production – land, labor, and capital (machinery and buildings). National accounting 
holds out the promise of a quantitative understanding of growth, in which the relative 
contributions of the major factors of production could be assessed (Solow 1956, Dennison 
1962). 
It soon became apparent, however, that an analysis of this kind could explain only a relatively 
small part of the growth in economic output and ultimately in living standards. Moreover, ever 
since the nineteenth century, economists had struggled with a paradox. For a given population 
and supply of land, the well-established law of diminishing marginal returns implied that 
additional investments in capital would produce smaller and smaller increases in output until 
the economy ultimately reached a stationary state. However, experience showed (or seemed to 
show) that growth could continue indefinitely, with no obvious tendency to slow down. 
Something was missing, the so-called „Solow residual‟ (OECD 1964). 
It was soon recognised that the “missing factor” was technological progress, and models of 
economic growth were adjusted to include technological progress. This change allowed 
economic models to fit the observed data, but it did not really add any explanatory power. 
Technological change appeared as an exogenous deus ex machina, not affected by economic 
outcomes. But, as Arrow (1962) observed, technological progress and the inventions and 
discoveries on which it rests are products of economic activity. 
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Although various attempts were made to capture this insight in models of economic growth, 
the crucial advances were made in the 1980s with the development of “endogenous growth 
theory” (Romer 1994). The most important observation was that, unlike labor and capital, 
information is a public good. That is, the use of information by one person does not reduce its 
availability for others. On the contrary, the more information is used, the more it is refined and 
extended. 
This observation points the way to resolution of the great paradox that had bedevilled growth 
theory. The law of diminishing returns applies on the assumption that the economy as a whole 
is characterised by constant returns to scale; that is, if the inputs of land, labor, and capital are 
all doubled, so is total output. The idea is simple. With a doubling of all inputs, each worker has 
access to the same amount of land and capital and so can produce exactly the same amount as 
before. Since there are twice as many workers, total output is doubled. More generally, if all 
inputs increase proportionally, output increases in the same proportion. The law of diminishing 
marginal returns now follows. If only one input, such as capital, increases, output must 
decrease less than proportionally. 
By contrast, since information is a public good, production based on information displays 
increasing returns to scale. If there are twice as many workers, and twice as much information, 
each worker has twice as much information to work with. So each worker will produce more 
and, with twice as many workers, output will more than double. 
This insight is of fundamental importance in understanding technological progress in an 
information economy. Unfortunately, economists did not spend a lot of time thinking about it. 
Instead, they were concerned to show that the increasing returns to scale were consistent with 
steady economic growth, rather than an explosive acceleration producing what Kurzweil 
(2005) and others refer to as “the singularity.” Romer and others showed that, as long as new 
knowledge had to be produced by a commercial R&D sector, endogenous growth models could 
produce steady rather than explosive growth. Attention in the literature then turned to issues of 
industry structure that need not concern us here.The shift of attention in endogenous growth 
theory left unexplored many questions about the production of information and its implications 
for the economy. The importance of these questions has become critical with the rise of the 
digital economy. 
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The digital economy 
The digital economy of the 21st century differs in fundamental respects from the industrial 
economy of the 20th. The most obvious difference is the dominant role of a single sector, 
information and communication technology, as the primary source of innovation. The rate of 
technological progress in this field has been so startling as to defy easy description. A 
telephone costing a few hundred dollars has more computing power and data storage capacity 
than were available to the entire world in the 1960s.  
Equally striking, by contrast, is the stagnation in sectors like transport, previously the standard 
symbolic indicator of technological progress from the Steam Age to the Jet Age and then to the 
(hoped for) Space Age. Indeed, there are notable areas of retrogression. In the 1960s, the 
United States could put a man on the moon. Today, it can barely reach low earth orbit.  
Similarly, in air transport, the Boeing 747, introduced in the 1960s, is still in service and its 
replacements (the A380 and B787) are little more than updates on the existing model. Its 
putative successor in terms of technological advance, the supersonic Concorde was withdrawn 
from service in 2003. The contrast between this 50 years of stagnation and the rapid progress in 
the decades after the Wright Brothers pioneering flight is stunning. 
Computers made striking progress from their introduction during World War II to the end of 
the 20th century, but the truly critical development in the rise of the digital economy has been 
the creation of the Internet. The Internet changes everything, not merely because of its direct 
effects but because of the nature of the associated economic activity, from its earliest origins to 
the present. 
Most previous technical innovations were developed by private manufacturers using 
commercial research and development processes to exploit the findings of publicly funded 
pure research. These innovations relied on a mixture of patents, trade secrecy and first mover 
advantage to secure the profits needed to fund innovation (Quiggin 2005). 
By contrast, the Internet arose from efforts by universities and other publicly funded research 
organisations to improve communications and the sharing of information. Its Architecture 
depends mainly on open-source software. Commercialisation came relatively late, and largely 
involved the exploitation of ideas developed in the non-profit sector. Even purely commercial 
innovations like Twitter and Facebook depend primarily on user-generated content, largely 
derived from the household sector. 
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Irrelevance of C20 notion of value added 
The central role of value added in national accounting is based on the division of the industrial 
economy into primary, secondary and tertiary or service sectors. This division made sense in 
the first half of the 20th century, when the three sectors were comparable in size, and when 
most service industries involved the distribution and sale of goods produced in the primary and 
secondary sectors. 
Over the second half of the century, however, the service sector grew to dominate the 
economy. Increasingly, moreover, economic activity focused on pure services, such as health, 
education and cultural industries, and financial services, which were not associated with the 
distribution of goods, and therefore did not fit the standard three-sector division.  
As late as 1990, the three-sector division was still workable, with primary and secondary 
industry (including construction) accounting for around 40 per cent of economic activity 
(GDP, excluding the imputed rent of dwellings) and „tertiary‟ services such as retail and 
wholesale trade for another 15 per cent.  „Pure‟ services accounted for the remaining 45 per 
cent. By 2013, however, the positions had reversed, with pure services accounting for the 
majority of economic activity, according to the national accounts. Appropriately enough the 
switchover from a mainly industrial to a pure service economy occurred almost exactly at the 
beginning of the 21st century, at least by this measure. 
Most pure services rely heavily on information. This is most obvious in relation to education, 
financial services and business services such as accounting, all of which have grown in relative 
importance, but it is also true of health. 
The fact that traditional economic categories are no longer relevant in an information-based 
economy has been recognised before. Jones (1982) proposed to augment the traditional 
analysis by distinguishing a „quaternary sector‟ covering employment in information 
processing and related activities. Jones also proposed the inclusion of the household sector, 
traditionally excluded from national accounting and employment statistics, under the name 
„quinary sector‟.  
Although Jones was primarily concerned to give economic recognition to the productive role 
of housework, childcare and similar activities (mainly undertaken by women), his proposed 
quinary sector now appears prescient for a different reason. Recent developments suggest that 
the household sector may play a central role in the growth of the information economy, 
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blurring traditional boundaries between employment and household production. 
Thus, information-based service activities and information-based occupations are growing in 
relative importance. Moreover, within any given industry or occupation, the importance of 
information is growing. 
A new agenda for national accounts 
The rise of the digital economy suggests a new agenda for national accounts. Among the most 
important requirements are procedures for estimating (and valuing) stocks and flows of 
information and a new approach to growth accounting. These changes also imply a breakdown 
of the traditional division between household and market sectors of the economy. 
Estimating (and valuing) stocks and flows of information 
Some progress has been made towards estimating the rate at which new information is created.  
IDC Research (2010) estimated the annual creation of digital information in that year at around 
a zettabyte (10^21 bytes). The annual growth rate projected for the next decade is around 50 
per cent per year.2 Improvements in quantitative estimates of this kind will be an important 
task for 21st century national accounting. 
Estimating the volume of information creation and storage is a technically difficult, but 
conceptually fairly simple task. Estimating the economic value of this information is much 
more challenging. 
Standard economic analysis suggests that, as the cost of creating and storing information falls, 
so will the marginal value of the information. A video of a cat playing amusing tricks, 
reproduced and stored thousands of times after going viral, might account for as much 
information storage as an entire library, but is clearly of much lower value.  
On the other hand, it seems unlikely that the declining marginal value of information fully 
offsets the massive growth in volumes. Second, we can look at expenditure on computers, and 
                                                 
2 Although this is not quite consistent with the much-cited interpretation offered by Eric Schmidt of Google 
‘Every 2 Days We Create As Much Information As We Did Up To 2003’ 
(http://techcrunch.com/2010/08/04/schmidt-data/), some number of the kind appears plausible. For example, 
the number of printed books produced in Europe up to the end of the 18th century has been estimated at 
around 2 billion. Allowing for 5Mb/book, and treating every copy as distinct, this would require only 10^15 
bytes of data, or about 30 seconds of data creation at the current rate. Alternatively, we might use the Google 
estimate of 130 million different books published in history, and assume 10 000 copies per book and 1 MB per 
book, to get 10^19 or 3 days of data creation at the current rate. 
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on communication and storage devices. Expenditure on computers, telecommunications and 
storage has risen over time, but remains small in terms of GDP. 
Second, we can consider time inputs to information creation and storage (compare travel cost 
method in hedonic valuation.  In the early 1990s, only a small minority of the population had 
access to the Internet, and this was typically limited to intermittent dialup connections.  
Today, by contrast, most people in Australia and other developed countries have access to 
broadband Internet, and many are permanently connected. The time spent actively engaged in 
the Internet economy has been estimated at around 3 hours per day. 
Growth accounting in the digital economy 
No comprehensive assessment of the impact of information services on economic growth 
appears to have been attempted. However, given the rapid increase in reliance of such services 
for all kinds of activity, the impact is obviously substantial.  A useful starting point is an 
analysis by the World Bank (2009) which estimated that an increase of 10 percentage points in 
broadband penetration yielded a 1.2 per cent increase in GDP. This increase must consist 
almost primarily of increases in total factor productivity, though it may also have been 
associated with some capital deepening.  Given the correlation between broadband access and 
Internet and computer use more generally, it seems reasonable to take this as an estimate of the 
productivity impact of ICT. 
Some calculation will help to show the significance of this finding. As of 2013, 74 per cent of 
Australian households had broadband internet access, up from essentially zero in the late 
1990s. If we assume an annual increase of 5 percentage points over the period since 2000,  
then broadband and ICT contribute around 0.6 percentage points to MFP growth.  
The long-term annual increase in multifactor productivity growth in Australia has been around 
1 per cent (Quiggin 2006)3. Hence, around 60 per cent of productivity growth since the turn of 
the century may be attributed to the Internet. 
 
                                                 
3 Measures of multifactor productivity growth have shown a sustained decline since 2000. However, as argued in 
Quiggin (2011), this decline is spurious and offsets an earlier spurious increase observed in the 1990s. 
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Estimate (and value) hours of household work 
As has already been noted, it is important to improve our understanding of household time 
spent participating in the Internet economy, through browsing websites, reading and posting on 
social media, reading and commenting on blogs, wikis and so on. These forms of activity have 
grown rapidly both in terms of the proportion of the population engaged and in terms of hours 
spent per day. 
 
This suggests the need for a more general reassessment of household labour. The rise of a 
service economy means that the 20th century distinction between household and market 
sectors is no longer tenable. The traditional gender distinctions associated with a largely 
industrial economy have broken down.  Employment rates for men and women are now only 
modestly different, reflecting both the impact of feminism and the fact that there are now very 
few jobs where physical strength is a crucial requirement.  All of this has been reinforced by 
the rise of the Internet. 
Concluding comments 
During the 20th century, national accounts functioned both as a tool of short-term 
macroeconomic management and as the starting point (sometimes the end point) for 
assessments of medium-term and long-term economic performance.  For both purposes, GDP 
was the preferred measure.  
In the new information economy, this dual-purpose approach can no longer be sustained. GDP 
should cease to be a preferred indicator of economic performance, and its use should be 
confined to its technical role in macroeconomic policy. The question is: what should we use to 
replace GDP? 
The construction of national accounts by Colin Clark and others was a major contribution to, 
and assisted the documentation of, the prosperity of the second half of the 20th century.We 
similarly radical innovations for the 21st century.  
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